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G-BOAF: Special Category Certificate of Airworthiness requested by British Airways for approval to perform crew training prior to the aircraft’s return to service, following the post Paris crash modification


CAA NOTE: G-BOAF: Special Category Certificate of Airworthiness Request






AIRCRAFT TYPE: Concorde Variant 102




OPERATOR: British Airways


INSTALLER: British Airways








Special Category Certificate of Airworthiness


1. Introduction


1.1 On 25th July 2000, an Air France Concorde F-BTSC was destroyed in a fatal crash shortly after take-off from Charles de Gaulle airport Paris.


1.2 Following tyre failure large fragments from tyre number 2 on the left main landing gear led to secondary damage around the landing gear including the rupture of number 5 fuel tank resulting in a large fuel leak and sustained fire.


1.3 A package of modifications has been raised by the manufacturers to prevent a similar occurrence. This modification package will be formally approved by DGAC-F and that approval validated by an addendum to this AAN.


1.4 British Airways have requested approval to perform crew training prior to the aircraft’s return to service.


2. Modification Definition


2.1 The following modifications have applied to the subject aircraft:


    • Modification 1905 – Installation of Fuel Tank Liner.

    • Modification 1909 – Landing Gear Bay Electrical Harness Armouring.

    • Modification 1911 – Data Gathering.

    • Modification 1915 – Brake Fan Inhibit at Take-Off.

    • Modification 1917 – New Michelin “N.Z.G.” Tyre.

    • Modification 1921 – Miscellaneous Changes to the Water Deflector.


This modification introduces an amendment to the profile of the water deflector and removes the cable reinforcing. For Special Category Certificate of


Airworthiness as far as the cable reinforcing is concerned either standard is acceptable, cable removed or cable installed.


2.2 At the present time investigations of the analysis and testing, including Ground and


Flight Tests undertaken have established that compliance with the Certification Basis has been sufficiently demonstrated to qualify an aircraft so modified for certification in the Special Category.


2.3 British Airways and the manufacturer have requested certification in the Special Category for the purpose of crew training.


3. Approval Procedures


This modification approval/validation has been carried out in accordance with Concorde Airworthiness Procedures.


4. Basis of Validation/Approval


4.1 CAA Validation/Approval Basis for the Modification


Concorde TSS Standards together with CRI 01.01.


4.2 CAA Design Requirements for Certificate of Airworthiness


Not applicable


4.3 Environmental Requirements


Not applicable


4.4 Design Requirements Associated With Operational Approvals


Not applicable


5. Compliance with the Basis of Certification/Validation/Approval


5.1 Compliance with the Certification/Validation Basis for the Modification


5.2 Compliance with Design Requirements for Certificate of Airworthiness


Not applicable.


5.3 Compliance with Environmental Requirements


This modification is assessed as having no adverse effect on the aircraft noise, and the status of the aircraft relative to the noise legislation is unaffected. The existing noise certificate, if any, remains valid.


5.4 Compliance with Design Requirements Associated With Operational Approvals


Compliance has been established with the design requirements which are a pre-requisite to approval of the associated operation. This finding of compliance with the design requirements does not signify that any operational approval has been granted.


5.5 Required (Amendments To) Manuals and Other Documents Including Mandatory




5.5.1 Concorde Type 1 Variant 102 Flight Manual reference CSD/FM/2 has been amended by the introduction of the following Temporary Revisions TR 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362 and 363.


5.5.2 British Airways Flight Crew Notice FCN 05/01 and FCN 04/01 are also applicable in lieu of TR 355 and TR 364.


5.5.3 The MMEL is amended to add the Tyre Under Deflation Detection System as a NO


GO item. An additional limitation is also introduced such that the system is serviceable up to the commencement to take-off run.


6. Conditions Affecting This Approval


6.1 All placards specified by the manufacturer/modification must be installed. Limitations, and conditions defined in the modification/manufacturer’s documentation, and the Flight Manual Supplement must be observed.


6.2 The compatibility of this modification with other previously approved modifications, installed on the particular aircraft, must be verified by the installer. Where the potential for interactions between modifications exists, the advice of the CAA shall be sought.


6.3 Certain operational approvals require that the aircraft and/or systems comply with specified design requirements. Where this AAN records compliance with those design requirements this shall not be taken as acceptance by the CAA of compliance with the relevant operational requirements, for which further justification may be required.


6.4 On the positioning flight to and return flight from Shannon, British Airways are authorised to carry nominated personnel required to support crew training.


These personnel will be limited to:


    • Operating Flight Crew.

    • Positioning Flight Crew.

    • Cabin Crew.

    • Ground Crew.


7. Continued Airworthiness


The influence of the modification on Airworthiness Directive, Service Bulletin eligibility and other data must be considered and the publications monitored accordingly. The maintenance schedule for the aircraft should include reference to this material additional to the original design


8. Survey


This aircraft G-BOAF being the first to embody the modifications to be approved under this


AAN, has been surveyed by the CAA.


In the particular areas examined during the survey the modified aircraft was found to conform with the standard recorded by this AAN.


9. Authorisation of Release to Service


In addition to the actions required by the procedures for release to service following maintenance or modification, the following actions must be completed prior to signing the


Certificate of Release to Service:


a. All actions and ground test procedures specified by the modification instructions must be completed satisfactorily.


b. It must be verified that the documents or amendments to documents, and the placards defined under Section 5.5 above are as specified, including any changes specified under Section 8 above.


10. Approval


It is hereby recommended that the design standard of the subject aircraft or any other


Concorde Variant 102 to the same design standard is eligible for certification in the Special Category.


It should be noted that flights over or into another country by the aircraft whilst the Special


Category is in force will normally require the permission of the Authority of that country.


D J Clement




For the Civil Aviation Authority


Date 1 August 2001



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